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This study aims at the analysis of the possible self-referential effects of economic theories and models on its own 
subject and of the mechanisms through which bounded rational actors perceive the self-referential nature of economic 
theories and might absorb their prescriptions. Thus, the focus of the present study will be on the effects of economic 
theories on the behaviour of the analyzed economic actors. The analysis of the possible causal role of theories on 
bounded rational economic behaviour will be interpreted as a sort of validity test of economic theory. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Bounded rational social actors are not just stimulus-response machines but more 
complex beings, whose actions are led by their own beliefs and mental representations. 
Such representations can shape mental models, i.e. subjective theoretical frameworks 
that predict the course of the social system the actors are involved in and that establish 
cause-effect relations that the individual uses in her decision-making. Individuals can 
also modify their mental models when they are not satisfied with the results of their 
application. Such learning operation requires that the individuals are able to reflect the 
theoretical statements on themselves and on the situation they are confronted with.  
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According to the result of this reflection process, they will then decide which theory 
they want to refer to, or in other words, which theory they want to absorb. 
Economic theories aim at the description and prediction of economic behaviour and 
interactions, but at the same time interfere with the phenomena they aim to depict. 
Revealed theories, if accepted, may influence the behaviour of the agents they focus on, 
either in the sense of validation of the theoretical content, or in that of its rejection. 
This analysis tries to discuss the implications of those recursive, or self-reflexive effects 
of economic theories on bounded rational economic behaving and interacting. In 
particular, a distinction will be made between the perception of the self-referentiality of 
a theory by bounded rational individuals (i.e. the perception of its applicability to a 
concrete setting) and its absorption (i.e. the compliance of the decision makers with the 
prescriptions of the theory). 
A factor that makes the role of mainstream theories in influencing economic interactions 
and behaviour even more complicated to evaluate is the discrepancy between the 
neoclassical rationality standard and the observable cognitive limitations to the 
subjective rationality. The problem of how bounded rational actors process the content 
of theories of full rationality undoubtedly is worth of being explicitly analyzed, 
particularly for the aim of enhancing efficient economic advising. Normative 
prescriptions for economic advising could also be taken from theories of bounded 
rationality, if it could be proven that such theories enjoy a broader acceptance by the 
bounded rational actors and survive to their absorption. 
The paper is organized as follows: After an introduction on the concept of “self-
reference” (Section 2) and on its implications for social reality (Section 3) and social 
theorizing (Section 4), the absorption of economic theories will be discussed (Section 5). 
To deepen the mechanisms through which bounded rational individuals may process 
and absorb economic theories within the bounds of their subjective rationality, the 
rationality standard of the economic actors will be specified (Section  6) and their 
cognitive processes will be discussed from a constructivist perspective (Section 7). An 
approach to the experimental analysis of self-referentiality and absorption of economic 




2.  The Concept of Self-Reference 
“Without a wide range of abilities to refer, we would be bereft of thoughts, memories, and sensations.” 
(Bartlett, 1987, p. 5) 
 
„Self-reference [is] in the context of language, a statement that refers to itself or 
contains its own referent. […] In the more general sense, self-reference is involved in a 
description which refers to something that affects, controls or has the power to modify 
the form or the validity of that description. […] In this general sense, self-reference 
establishes a circularity that may involve not only referential but also causal, 
interpersonal or instrumental relations and thereby constitute a unity of its own.” 
(Krippendorff, 1986)
1 
Self-reference occurs whenever something refers to itself. Many studies on self-
reference concern linguistic questions, where a self-referential sentence is a statement 
that refers to itself, or contains its own referent, i. e. falls into its own domain. Lots of 
elementary linguistic forms present a self-referential character, definite descriptions or 
proper names, for instance.
2 There are different degrees of semantical self-reference, 
depending on if the sentence refers exclusively to itself, or also to itself as a member of 
the whole class of reference. An example of a totally self-referring sentence is “This is a 
short statement”, while the sentence “All the sentences on this page are meaningful” is 
just partially self-referring. Furthermore, a statement can also be incidentally self-
referring if it can be interpreted as a self-reference, only if the statement itself belongs to 
the sub-class to which it refers; for example, “Some sentences on this page are 
meaningful”.
3 In set theoretical terms, a relation R can be said to be self-referential in a 
set S if it relates every element a of S to itself, i.e. aRa, for each a belonging to S.
4 
The phenomenon of referring is almost pervasive and might appear in thoughts, 
conceptualizations, and expressions.
5 The human capability of referring creates the basis 
for ordering the subjective perception of the world, for interpreting events, interacting 
with others etc.; thus creates the basis for all activities which regard human cognition 
                                                 
1 http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Asc/SELF-REFERE.html 
2 Cf. Bartlett (1987), p. 5. Going more into details, there is a vivid debate on the legitimacy of self-
referential sentences, as well as on the relations between linguistic self-referential sentences and 
paradoxes. See for more information Bartlett (1987) and Whewell (1987). 
3 Cf. Whewell (1987), p. 32-33. 
4 Cf. Davis / Klaes (2003), p. 329. 
5 Cf. Bartlett (1987), p. 5.  
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and which are essential for individual survival.
6 The human capability to establish self-
references is required even for self-change and behavioural adjustment. The reflexive 
capacity underlies basic problem-solving abilities and makes mental adaptiveness 
possible.
7 
Self-reference is strongly related to the concept of feedback and based on the 
mechanism of a feedback loop, whereas “a positive [resp. negative] feedback loop [is] 
a chain of cause-and-effect relationships closes on itself, so that increasing any one 
element in the loop will start a sequence of changes that will result in the originally 
changed element being increased [resp. decreased] even more”
8. An example of a 
positive feedback loop is the increase of money in a savings account due to the interest 
rate. 
Reflexivity has often been interpreted
9 as a possible menace to logical reasoning and as 
potentially leading to paradoxes. Since there are different forms of self-references, it is 
not possible to draw general conclusions on the logical legitimacy of reflexive 
mechanisms. The famous Liar´s paradox “p is false” leads to a contradiction, whether p 
is false or true, and therefore it constitutes an example of misleading, malignant, self-
reference. On the other side, the sentence “q is true” cannot be anything but true and 
valid, since the opposite (the Liar´s paradox) is contradictory per se. Thus, this is the 
case of a harmless, benign, self-reference. Generalizing those examples, self-references 
that present a self-reinforcing character - thus relying on a positive feedback loop - have 
a stabilizing effect on the phenomena they concern, while reflexivities acting in a self-
refuting way - i.e. based on a negative feedback loop - have a destabilizing nature.
10 
It is possible to enumerate lots of different types of self-references, and several attempts 
at classifications of this concept have been proposed. Mainly, there are two possible 
approaches for classifying the types of reflexivity: either focusing on the object 
involved in the self-referential relation, or on the kind of relation itself. Because of the 
pervasiveness of reflexivities, the first method may not offer manageable taxonomies, 
while the second may suffer from a lack of comprehensiveness. 
                                                 
6 Cf. Bartlett (1987), p. 5. 
7 Cf. Bartlett (1987), p. 6. 
8 Cf. Bartlett (1987), pp. 21-22. 
9 This relates particularly to the fields of philosophy, logic, and scientific methodology. 
10 Cf. Davis / Klaes (2003), p. 333.  
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Self-referential relations can establish tautological, set-theoretical, pragmatical or meta-
logical relations.
11 A tautological self-reference can be also defined as a static relation, a 
self-reference that does not add anything but redundant information to its predicate. A 
set-theoretical reflexive relation generates mostly paradoxes and it appears when set-
memberships are used in a reflexive way. Graucho Marx´s gag: “I don’t want to belong 
to any club that will accept me as a member,” is an example of such reflexivity. When 
the content of a sentence and the sentence itself refer to each other, i.e. when the 
sentence falls into its own domain, as in the sentence “there are no truths” for instance,  
it can be called a pragmatic, or performative self-reference. Finally, the relation 
“between a truth-functional referring proposition and the set of conditions which are 
necessary in order for the proposition to be capable of referring at all”
12 can be defined 
as meta-logical, since it occurs transcending the same logic it states. Meta-logical self-
reference can represent a limitation, whenever it implies a self-falsifying, or self-
refusing dynamics, while it can be interpreted constructively, if it involves self-
validation.
13 Scientific reasoning often involves meta-logical referring. 
Another interesting taxonomy of self-references has been proposed by Davis and 
Klaes  (2003). They distinguish between immanent, epistemic, and transcendent 
reflexivity, depending on which levels the reflexive relation involves. Immanent 
reflexivity means a reflection from an entity to itself, while epistemic reflexivity results 
from a conscious act of a subject referring to itself. Eventually, the transcendent 
reflexivity almost coincides with the meta-logical self-reference presented above. 
As said, the present analysis focuses on the recursivity of economic theorizing and its 
effects for the economic actors. Since economic theories are social theories and 
necessarily embedded in social reality, a short digression on some well-known 
examples of recursive social phenomena will precede some considerations on the 
recursivity of social theorizing, which will then introduce some notes on the absorption 
of economic theories. 
 
                                                 
11 This classification of self-references is freely based on Bartlett (1987). 
12 Cf. Bartlett (1987), p. 10. 
13 For more on the constructive versus critical use of self-reference involving human understanding see 
e.g. Bartlett (1992), pp. 3 - 6.  
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3.  Recursivity in Social Reality 
 
Recursive relations play an important role for social phenomena and are almost 
pervasive, both of social reality and of the social sciences. Examples of recursive 
phenomena may regard almost all aspects of social reality and have always attracted the 
attention of social analysts. The individuals involved in a social system act 
intentionally – i.e. they try to reach a certain end state from a given initial state using 
(limited) own capacities and extraneous resources - and define in this way the system´s 
course. So, the individual mental representations and expectations play a decisive role 
in shaping social reality. Reflexivity may also lead an erroneous statement to become 
true or invalidate a true one; thus it can act in a self-fulfilling, or self-destroying way. 
The problem of reflexive predictions concerns all behavioural sciences. A published 
prediction may affect the predicted event, or process, and then, as a so-called “self-
altering prediction”, either works toward the self-fulfillment, or the self-destruction of 
the prediction if it is not “neutral” in the sense that both tendencies compensate each 
other. Plenty of examples of self-fulfilling as well as of self-destroying dynamics can be 
mentioned. The disclosure of a public opinion survey can manipulate its results, by 
acting in a self-fulfilling way. Similarly, the German Federal High Court recently had to 
decide on the responsibility of the Deutsche Bank for the bankruptcy of Kirch’s 
corporation; Kirch accused the bank of having caused its bankruptcy by publicly 
doubting its creditworthiness. 
Additionally, ideologies may have a self-referential effect, since they tend to be self-
validating systems of beliefs, thus self-reinforcing and self-isolating. Revolutions can be 
seen as recursive phenomena as well, where the internal dynamics of a political system 
may become self-destructive. The Pygmalion, or Rosenthal, effect refers to situations in 
which pupils, who are expected to perform better than others, will indeed perform better. 
This effect was first examined in a study by Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968, 1992), in 
which some teachers were misleadingly told that some children had a higher-than-
average IQ. It was shown that the expectations of the teachers led the children to an 
actual enhancement of their performance. 
That the patient’s symptoms can be alleviated, just because of the belief in the efficacy 
of an otherwise ineffective treatment, is the well-known placebo effect. The opposite  
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effect - the so called “nocebo effect” - can occur as well, if a patient disbelieves an 
effective treatment. 
The attention financial investors pay to what can be called the “market psychology” 
reveals that financial markets are also highly self-referential. Soros (1994) describes the 
dynamic of financial markets by means of a reflexivity theory, according to which the 




4.  Recursivity of Social Theorizing 
 
Social theorizing can be affected by recursivity in two different ways: first, a social 
scientist inevitably is part of the system she analyses and second, theories can affect the 
state and the evolution of the social system they aim to describe. Though the first sort of 
recursivity regards all forms of human theorizing, since the scientist can never be 
completely disentangled from the reality she examines,
15  the fact that theories may 
“interfere” with the evolution of the system they aim to describe is a peculiarity of the 
social sciences. Obviously, it stems from the coincidence between subject and object of 
the analysis. The focus here will be on this latter sort of recursivity, which we will call 
reflexivity or self-referentiality, on its impact on social predicting as well as on the 
conditions under which a theory may actually imply recursive effects. 
 
4.1. Explaining and Predicting the Social Reality 
Natural sciences do not suffer from the second sort of reflexivity mentioned above 
(“Nature does not care – so we assume – if we penetrate her secrets”
16), and therefore 
explaining and predicting the natural phenomena can be seen as symmetric processes. 
Explaining is the codification of a particular real situation, or event, by means of 
abstracting some conditions that apply and some theoretical laws, while predicting 
means proceeding in the opposite logical direction. Predicting starts from the 
observation that in the particular situation examined certain conditions take place. By 
                                                 
14 For more experimental evidence on reflexive predictions, see e.g. Marx (2006). 
15 See for instance the indeterminism problem of quantum physics. 
16 Cf. Morgenstern (1972), p. 707.  
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means of application of the theoretical laws, which suit the conditions, the development 
of the observed situation will then be described. The common methodological ground 
between explaining and predicting can be found in the explicating process; that is, the 



























Fig. 1: Explaining and Predicting the Social Reality 
 
As represented in the flow chart in Fig. 1, even if the social and natural sciences are 
both based on the scientific methodology of explaining and predicting, recursivity 
disturbs the symmetry of those processes for social theorizing. 
On the left side of the flow chart, the process of scientific explaining of social reality is 
depicted, while the right side represents that of social predicting. 
Explaining social reality means at first to observe a social phenomenon and then to 
codify it in a stylized way. This “stylized reformulation” („This stylized reformulation 
is the actual common sense understanding of the scientific community of the real 
situation which gives the subject of the analysis“)
 18  is the expression of the actual 
mainstream codification of the situation in question. Such reformulation gives evidence 
                                                 
17 Cf. Güth/Kliemt (2001), p. 1. For a definition of “explication”, cf. Carnap (1956) 
18 Cf. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (1996), p. 46.  
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of some “abstract conditions” that can properly depict the situation in a standardized 
and comparable manner, so that a suitable “theoretical framework”  – a theory or a 
model - may be found or worked out and an “explanation” of the social phenomenon 
can be achieved. 
Predicting social reality can be characterized as a successive step of the scientific 
procedure, and be interpreted as a first test of the validity of scientific explaining.
19 For 
this reason, the process of social forecasting can be read as articulating in the opposite 
logical direction of that of explaining. Consequently, the forecasting process goes top-
down on the flow chart and starts exactly from the “explanation.” 
The first step in order to forecast a social phenomenon is to insert it (again) into the 
“theoretical framework” which suited the “explanation”. The “abstract conditions” that 
the phenomenon can be reduced to should be compared with those that led to the choice 
of the theoretical framework. If they are coherent to each other, a “stylized formulation 
of a future state” - in other words, a “prediction” – can be elaborated. As already stated, 
it makes a great difference if a social prediction is published, or not. A published social 
prediction may lead social actors to modify their behaviour, either in order to fulfil, or 
to destroy the prediction’s content. In this way, social predicting can influence its own 
object, i.e. the forecasted reality. 
Every step of explaining and predicting the social reality can be affected by some 
distortions, which mainly stem from the cognitive and computational limitations of the 
individual. Going, as before, top-down, the theoretical framework can be affected by the 
problem of the validity of the theories or of the models chosen; they may be mis-
specified or even ideologically distorted. Both the abstraction of conditions in the 
explaining process and their application in the predicting process can be of course 
affected by the application problem. Further, as every stylization is the reduction of the 
redundant aspects of a complex reality, such an operation is per se arbitrary, and 
scientific stylizations, even if they are based on strong codified and standardized 
methods, make no exception. Thus, both the stylized reformulation of a complex real 
phenomenon (on which the explanation relies) and the stylized formulation of a future 
state (the prediction) cannot be but selective and may be distorted and undermined by 
information deficiencies. 
                                                 
19 That will be discussed in more details later, cf. Section 5.  
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A last sort of distortion is related only to the predicting process and it deals with the 
publication of social predictions. Once again, if a prediction gets communicated to the 
social agents, it leads them to modify their behaviour. Whether the prediction gets 
fulfilled or destroyed, the reaction of the social agents invalidates it on its essence and, 
in the same way, even a further prediction, that captures this reaction, will be affected 
from this self-referentiality problem. 
By strict logical reasoning, Morgenstern
20   came to the conclusion that social 
phenomena cannot be foreseen, since revealed social predictions influence the analysed 
system in a way that can in principle never be correctly evaluated. Morgenstern´s 
argumentation is that every social prediction is followed by a behavioural adjustment of 
the social actors, and that even a reformulation of this prediction, which takes into 
account this feedback, will be followed by another adjustment and so on. This infinite 
re-adjustment process is known as the “Morgenstern Paradox” and can be represented as 
in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2: The Morgenstern Process (from Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, 1990, p. 149) 
 
Given a prediction (P1) about a social event, it is reasonable to assume that its object 
will react to it and such a reaction invalidates the original prediction. Assuming that the 
reaction (R1) is known to the forecasters, a new prediction, P2, which takes into account 
R1, should now be formulated. P2 will also generate a reaction to itself, R2, so that 
                                                 
20 Cf. Morgenstern (1928) and (1935). 
Prediction 1  Reaction 1 
Prediction 2  Reaction 2 






another prediction, P3, will be necessary. From a purely logical point of view, this 
infinite recursive process between prediction and reaction makes it impossible to deal 
correctly with social predictions, and also with the theme of the self-referentiality of 
social theory. About the question of whether the Morgenstern Paradox has also an 
empirical and not merely a logical validity, a vivid debate flourished in economic 
literature
21. It can be demonstrated however (both in a mathematical and a pragmatic 
way) that the conclusions, to which the Morgenstern Paradox leads, are not sustained 
from the evidence. 
As Grunberg and Modigliani  (1954) demonstrate by a fixed-point argument, the 
Morgenstern Process may not occur at all in that there is (at least) one fixed-point of a 
suitable self-mapping which coincides with a correct, though self-altering, prediction. 
Another case is that of convergence of the Morgenstern process where the limit point 
represents a correct prediction of the phenomenon (see Lehmann-Waffenschmidt 1990, 
1996). Thus, the infinitely evolving Morgenstern Process not admitting a finite solution 
regarding to correctly predicting refers to the non-convergent case of two conceivable 
cases. 
A pragmatic solution of the Morgenstern Paradox can also be formulated, considering 
that in reality nobody can perform infinite reflection processes. Two sorts of limitations 
occur: the bounded rationality of the subjects and natural restrictions. Bounded rational 
subjects are not able to perform infinite steps of recursive reasoning, and in the 
meantime are aware that the other interacting subjects won’t do it. This is proved, for 
instance, by the experimental evidence from beauty contest interactions: in those 
situations  - where individuals have to guess what the others are going to 
choose - subjects usually perform only a few (two or three) reflection steps. Natural 
restrictions refer to time restrictions (the real choice-making process cannot take an 
infinite time horizon) as well as to cost restrictions (time has an opportunity cost). This 
explains why even fully rational subjects could not perform infinite reflection processes. 
Another crucial point regarding the self-altering effect of revealed social predictions is 
whether they are believed, or not. The “compliance” with a prediction depends strictly 
on the perception the agents have of its validity. Even theoretically erroneous statements 
                                                 
21 Among others see Bosse (1957) and Grunberg/Modigliani (1954). For a reconsideration cf. Lehmann-
Waffenschmidt (1990).  
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could became self-fulfilling only because believed by the individuals, or supposed to be 
believed by the majority of them. Similarly, the concept of “sunspots equilibrium”
22 
refers in economics to situations in which the market outcome and allocation of 
resources depend on variables that only matter because individuals believe they do. 
 
4.2. Self-Referential Theories 
There can be different notions of self-referential theories, at first because there is much 
hidden behind the concept of “theory” and then because of the polymorphism of 
recursive relations. 
“Theory” can be meant as one, or several, statements that describe a property, a 
peculiarity, or more generally a certain aspect of a certain object. An economic theory 
will be conceived here as a conditional generalization, i.e. as a statement of the sort: 
“for every x, if P of x, then Q of x.”
23 
It should first be stated that following a radical constructivist perspective,
24 every sort of 
theorizing would be but self-referential because of the interdependence between 
observer and observation. Similarly, the approach of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge asks whether the view of a scientist who stays in a disentangled relation to 
the world  - which is, in the end, the object of her analysis  - can be realistically 
sustainable.
25 
However, in a strict sense, a theory should be said to be self-referential if it refers to 
itself  - if it contains sentences or theorems related to the theory itself, e.g. meta-
theoretical considerations. In other words, a self-referential theory applies to itself, i.e. 
the theory falls into its own domain and thus becomes an object of itself. 
In a broader sense, a theory that deals with something that can modify, or affect, the 
validity of its content also implies a recursive relation and thus can be said to be self-
referential. To this category of recursivity  – which implicates a meta-logical 
referring  - also belong all conceptualizations, where is sought to know the 
                                                 
22 Cf. Cass / Shell (1983). 
23 Cf. Dacey (1976), p. 249. 
24 For an introduction cf. Rusch (1999), or Schmidt (1987). 
25 Cf. Woolgar (1992), p. 334.  
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presuppositions involved in knowing. This occurs whenever observer and observation 
are part of the same system. 
The social sciences are intrinsically exposed to this sort of recursivity, since they are the 
product of the reflection of individuals upon selected “facets” of the individual in her 
social system. Social sciences aim at the description of a system made by an observer, 
who inevitably is part of the system observed. Thus, considerations on meta-logical 
reflexivity suit undoubtedly the social sciences and indicate their self-referential nature. 
The kind of social theory which is known to the social actors who are interacting in a 
social system can affect the social system itself: “There is thus a “back-coupling” or 
“feed-back” between the theory and the object of the theory.”
 26 Social theorizing can 
have both a self-supporting, or a self-refusing, impact on the social actors and on the 
social system it aims to analyze, since social actors can react opportunistically, or in 
opposite to the theorizing about themselves. That implies that every theoretical 
statement can be either invalidated, or reinforced, by the actors´ behaviour, as in a 
feedback loop. 
 
5.  Self-Referentiality of Economic Theories and Theory Absorption 
“I believe that the study of the degree of ´theory absorption´ by the members of the economy […] will 
make all of us more modest in judging how far we penetrated into the economic problems.” 
(Morgenstern, 1972, p. 707) 
 
To depict the fact that a social theory which is known to the actors interacting in a social 
system analyzed by this theory may affect the course of the social system itself, Oskar 
Morgenstern (1972) introduced the concept of “theory absorption.” Although 
potentially any economic theory can be absorbed for the resolution of a concrete 
problem,
27  the exact way of absorption differs from case to case, depending on its 
formulation, its understanding, and its acceptance by the members of the economic 
system, as well as on its accessibility.
28 Furthermore, past experiences and learning may 
also matter when it comes to evaluating the absorption of a certain theory. 
                                                 
26 Morgenstern (1972), p. 707. 
27 Cf. Dacey (1976), p. 248. 
28 Cf. Morgenstern (1972), p. 707.  
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A theory is said to be absorbed by an individual if that individual internalizes it in her 
own mental models and chooses to act according to its logical content. In interactive 
contexts, theory absorption will also be strongly related to the supposed mental models 
of the others. It can be distinguished among unilaterally-, partially-, and fully-
absorbable theories, depending on the number of individuals - from one to all - who 
follow its prescriptions and are satisfied with the result.
29 
Among the elements that determine, or influence, theory absorption, self-reference 
plays a preliminary role, in the sense that it can be characterized as a prerequisite for the 
absorption of a theory. Individuals self-refer a theoretical framework to support their 
decision-making and then choose whether to rely on it or not, in other words, whether to 
absorb that theory or not. 
Thus, theory absorption is a consequence of the self-referentiality of the social theory. 
An individual self-refers a theoretical statement and, according to the results of such 
reflection, she will then choose either to rely on that theoretical framework, or on a 
different one. In an ideal setting - populated by unbounded rational social actors - a 
theory of rational choice will be absorbed universally, such theory being at the same 
time descriptive and prescriptive of the full rational behaviour. In a real setting, thus 
populated by bounded rational social actors, things are slightly different and more 
complicated. A requisite for a theory to be absorbed is that it can be understood by the 
individuals  - i.e. it does not overstretch their bounded cognitive and computational 
capabilities  - and that it can be integrated with the subjective beliefs and mental 
representations. In particular, a theory can be absorbed if its content does not violate the 
normative components of beliefs as well as the beliefs about the others. 
Several attempts have been done to reduce the bounded rationality approach to the 
homo oeconomicus approach, mostly relying on the consideration that the social actors, 
though not fully rational, act “as if” they were. Among others, the generally accepted 
view that “The aim of a good theory is prediction and in prediction lies the ultimate test 
of validity”
30 has added some plausibility to the “as if” argument. But, in spite of that, 
the fact that in simple settings bounded rational best replies may coincide with optimal 
                                                 
29 Cf. Güth/Kliemt (2004a), p. 523. 
30 Cf. Morgenstern (1972).  
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responses is far to endorse the “as if” approach. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
satisficing behaviour can be simply read as a step towards optimization.
31 
Furthermore, it can be argued whether the proof of a behavioural theory, or model, i. e. 
its empirical validation, can solely be based on its accuracy of prediction, instead of also 
trying to describe the way a decision emerged. In other words, the validity of a 
behavioural theory should be proved “from inside,” and in this sense the proof of the 
absorption of a certain theory could also be interpreted as an ultimate test of the validity 
of such a theory in a concrete setting. As stated, the prerequisite of theory absorption is 
a self-application of a theoretical framework, and its conditions are its coherency with 
the subjective mental representations. The fact that individuals absorb a theory implies 
that they accept they will rely on it - i.e. that they are first able to conceptualize it, so 
that they share the rationality standard underlying such an approach - and then that they 
adhere to its logic. A theory that passes such a test can be said to assume a real 
descriptive validity of the behaviour of “human beings” dealing with economic 
decisions and not just of stylized economic subjects. 
 
6.  A Model of Bounded Rational Behaviour 
 
An essential tool in modelling economic behaviour is the representative agent 
framework which defines axiomatically the figure of the homo oeconomicus. Relying 
on the assumptions of fully rational behaviour and expectations, the homo oeconomicus 
approach interprets rational decision making as the result of optimization under 
constraints and it implies, for interactive situations, mutual rationality and consistency 
that guarantee an equilibrium outcome. Observations of reality, however, unequivocally 
lead to reject (except for some of the simplest cases) the assumptions of optimizing 
behaviour and of rational decision making. The concept of bounded rationality has been 
introduced
32   to point out the differences in the behaviour of a stylized homo 
oeconomicus and a real economic agent, where the latter cannot be seen as “a 
straightforward maximizer, but torn between the extremes of strategic calculation and 
                                                 
31 For more cf. Güth/Kliemt (2004a), p. 522-3. 
32 See e.g. Simon (1957).  
 17
blind rule following.”
33 Bounded rational behaviour can be seen as a “sub-species of 
rational behaviour.”
34 This is because the concept of bounded rationality does not deny 
deliberation, theorizing, or forward-looking strategic behaviour, but it allows those 
processes on the basis of the cognitive and computational limitations of concrete 
economic agents. In particular, bounded rational social actors are complex beings, who 
do not react in a deterministic way to the stimuli from the social system they are 
involved in, but whose actions are led by their own beliefs and mental representations. 
Beliefs are the simplest form of mental representations, whereas mental representations 
can be defined as coordinated sets of beliefs. Beliefs are characterized by the 
coexistence of normative and positive aspects.
35 Normative aspects regard what “ought 
to be” in the individual’s mind and include preferences about ideal states of the world. 
Positive aspects concern subjective theoretical statements that predict the course of the 
social system, and that establish cause-effect relations that support the individual in her 
decision-making. Positive aspects also concern expectations about the others, as a 
counterpart of social interactions. 
Mainstream game theory  - as a theory of rational decision making (rational 
choice) - focuses exclusively on the interpretation of beliefs as (rational) expectations 
about the others´ behaviour and denies the role of different subjective beliefs in shaping 
individual decision making. The recent approach of behavioural game theory integrates 
strategic game theoretical considerations with contributions from the behavioural 
sciences. In interactive situations agents think strategically, in the sense that they form 
beliefs about how the others might behave and then (bounded) best respond according 
to such beliefs. In fully rational settings, mutual consistent and rational beliefs would 
lead to the same rational behavioural patterns, i.e. to a unique and stable equilibrium.
36 
So, the rationality assumption can neither explain heterogeneous behaviour (since all 
individuals share the same rational beliefs), nor persistency of sub-optimal situations 
(since sub-optimal behaviour gets eliminated by optimal rational behaviour). 
                                                 
33 Güth/Kliemt (2004b), p. 17. 
34 Güth/Kliemt (2004a), p. 523. 
35 Slembeck (2003) states that the distinction between normative and positive beliefs is somehow artificial, 
because both sorts of beliefs tend to influence each other; p. 131. 
36 The general mechanism through which beliefs are updated is learning, which takes place, according to 
Camerer (2003), p. 1, when a change in behaviour due to experience can be observed.  
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Beliefs may be non-homogeneous, because they stem from lots of different and highly 
subjective factors,
37 they can be mistaken and also modified
38 if agents are not satisfied 
with the result of their application. The factors that shape the subjective beliefs cannot 
be classified exhaustively, essentially because the individual as a social actor is a non-
deterministic product of her social history.
39 The beliefs about the others, though also 
influenced by the individual social history, can be characterised much more as the 
product of introspection. 
It seems reasonable to assume that individuals perceive themselves as not perfectly 
rational, but bounded rational, and that they suppose others possess the same cognitive 
and computational capabilities.
40   In other words, individuals use the tool of 
introspection to form beliefs about others. This is an important way of trying to predict 
the others´ behaviour, since bounded rational behavioural pattern cannot be simply 
logically inferred. It must be here underlined that also introspection, as a product of 
bounded rational individuals, cannot be but bounded. Through introspection an 
individual will conceptualize just a finite number of iterations of strategic thinking, and 
she will then respond strategically to what she presumes is the last iteration of thinking 
performed by others. In this sense, each individual perceives herself as being the most 
sophisticated. 
This can be illustrated by the parable of Sherlock Holmes taking a train from London to 
Dover and getting off at an intermediate stop, because he expects his adversary, 
Professor Moriarty, to take a direct, faster, train to Dover in order to await him there.
 41 
This turns out to be a correct prediction for Moriarty´s behaviour. However, the story 
could have also developed in a different way, if Moriarty, anticipating Holmes´ decision 
of getting off the train before reaching Dover, would have done the same. This could 
have been again anticipated by Holmes, who would then stay in the train till Dover to 
                                                 
37 Among them are past experience, knowledge, expertise, social norms and individual perception of them, 
risk propensity and its frame, etc. 
38 Cf. Camerer (2003), p. 265. 
39 More in Berg/Dickhaut/McCabe (1995), or Mistri (1997). 
40 There is also evidence showing a clear tendency of overestimating the coincidence between the own 
and others’ motives (“consensus bias”), cf. e.g. Fields/Howard (1976-77). For more see 
Gilovich/Griffin/Kahneman (2002). 
41 Cf. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (1990), p. 150. Thus in Conan Doyle’s novel Sherlock Holmes finally 
wins this „expectations-expectations“ game expecting that Moriarty will perform only the first step of the 
mutual reflection process.   
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get rid of his adversary. In deciding how to behave, both Holmes and Moriarty assume 
to be a step ahead of the other, thus to be the most sophisticated. 
In many real situations, however, individuals with different cognitive abilities interact; 
some of them can be more experienced for instance, or cleverer, or simply have a better 
theoretic knowledge of the situation they are confronting. 
It could seem obvious, and it would also be adopting the neoclassical homo 
oeconomicus paradigm that a superior endowment of capabilities (experience, expertise, 
cleverness…) constitutes an advantage. In spite of that, what really matters in 
interactive situations is to be able to predict with accuracy the choices of others, in order 
to be able to best respond to their actual (in the observed case of asymmetry, probably 
inferior) behaviour. In such situations “superiorly endowed” individuals could 
misunderstand what motivates their “less endowed” counterparts and so behave in a too 
clever, unsuccessful way. Among others, results from the ultimatum game in 
Güth (1982) as well as findings from the “less-is-more” effect
42 corroborate this thesis. 
For those reasons, individuals who possess superior knowledge, expertise or capabilities 
could paradoxically decide not to rely - or at least not exclusively - on them, but instead 
on their common sense, in order to predict what a “representative” bounded rational 
individual might do. 
The influence of experience and of expertise on the behaviour of real economic actors 
has been deeply experimentally investigated, while systematic experimental evidence on 
the role of theoretic knowledge, particularly self-referential theoretical knowledge, not 
supported by experience is still missing.
43 Undoubtedly, it cannot be inferred in a purely 
logical way how bounded rational individuals understand and interpret theoretic 
statements, how they integrate their beliefs with such theoretic information, and what 
they make out of them in the interaction with other bounded rational individuals. 
Accordingly, experimental evidence is needed also in this case. But before developing 
an experimental approach to study this we have to think on a systematic base for this. In 
our eyes the constructivist approach qualifies for this.  
 
                                                 
42 Cf. Gigerenzer/Goldstein (2002). 
43 A contribution in this direction is Beckenkamp (2003).  
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7.  The Constructivist Approach to the Analysis of Cognitive Processes 
 
The framework of constructivism provides a philosophical basis for deepening the 
understanding of the general mechanism through which individuals form their beliefs as 
well as an explanation of its heterogeneity.
44 This approach, allowing for just partial 
subjective knowledge of the world, takes into account both “the intrinsic limits of the 
human mind in terms of computation and prediction capabilities… [and] the 
heterogeneity of agents in their beliefs and information endowments.”
45  Thus it is 
compatible with the bounded rationality approach, in particular for what concerns the 
assumption of satisficing instead of optimizing behaviour. Furthermore, relying on the 
constructivist approach, it seems possible to outline a framework in which the 
heterogeneity of knowledge and information and the subjective rationality of the 
individuals can be modelled in a mutually consistent way. 
“Knowledge” should be distinguished from “information”; the first being a “map from 
action to consequences… [which] is activated whenever the system changes its state”,
46 
the latter being the identification of a given state.
47  In a constructivist way
48,  “(i) 
knowledge is the output of active elaboration of the subject ranging from the selection 
of external inputs to the constructions of “models of the world”; (ii) the subject is 
continually engaged in the empirical control of such models, which thus act as a 
feedback mechanism in the construction process.”
49 This implies, in particular, that the 
individual’s “models of the world” cannot be isomorphic (i. e. 1-1) with an external 
world.
50  Also according to the bounded rational approach, the cognitive activity 
produces stylized subjective mental models to support the individual in her decision-
making; the individual will then evaluate the feedback such models receive from the 
external environment and, if satisfied, she will rely further on those models; if not, she 
will modify them. 
                                                 
44 The radical constructivist approach can be applied to most various aspects of economics, as done e.g. 
by Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (2002 and 2006a), Meier / Slembeck (1998), Ötsch (1996). 
45 Tamborini (1997), p. 255. 
46 Tamborini (1997), p. 257. 
47 Idem. 
48 Here is meant the approach of Watzlawick (1981). 
49 Tamborini (1997), p. 257. 
50  The radical branch of constructivism (cf. footnotes 24 and 47) denies the ex-ante existence of an 
(ontologically given) external world, since we cannot decide from our “relative” sensual perceptions, 
whether there is an ontological external world, or not. We will, however, not adopt, or discuss, this radical 
view here (cf. e. g. Watzlawick 1981, Schmidt 1987, Rusch 1999, or Lehmann-Waffenschmidt 2006a).  
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The cognitive process can be depicted as an input-output process with a feedback 
mechanism (cf. Fig. 3): 
 
INPUT heuristic faculties OUTPUT
External environment Internal environment
Validation
Empirical control and feedback
INPUT heuristic faculties OUTPUT
External environment Internal environment
Validation
Empirical control and feedback
 
 
Fig. 3: The cognitive process in the constructivist approach (cf. Tamborini, 1997, p. 258) 
 
Stimuli from the external environment, interpreted here in the form of physical signals 
and without any prior ontological assumption, are the inputs of the cognitive process 
and are elaborated in the internal environment. The internal environment, i.e. the 
“mind,” includes all thinking faculties. To represent its functioning, the computational 
approach
51 will be followed, which focuses on the mapping from external to internal 
states, the latter being interpreted as logical ordering of syntactic elements (“like steps 
in a computer programme”
52). An alternative approach could have been the „neural 
approach,“ which focuses on the physical disposition of the internal environment, thus 
on the particular configuration of the neuronal networks
53. The neural approach seems 
to have a better explanatory power for the unconscious mental processes, whereas the 
computational approach suits the representation of conscious thinking and decision-
making better.
54 
According to the computational approach, the mapping from external to internal states 
is based on a series of heuristic faculties, among which abstraction and causation are 
essential for rational decision-making. The internal environment produces as output a 
                                                 
51 Cf. Newell/Simon (1972), Simon (1977) and (1981). 
52 Cf. Tamborini (1997), p. 258. 
53 Cf. McClelland/Rumelhart, (1986). 
54 Cf. Tamborini (1997), p. 258.  
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representation, or a mental model, of the world, i.e. “a set of causally ordered 
relationships […] among selected objects or events, aimed at explanation and 
prediction.”
55 Causal ordering, i.e. how the human mind creates an efficient order for 
action,
56 plays a central role in human explaining and predicting. Rational actions are 
based on causal models that forecast in the individual´s mind the consequences of her 
actions. The bounded rationality approach relies consistently on the notion of mental 
models. To elaborate her mental models, the individual selects the external signals and 
combines them according to pre-existing patterns of configuration; the combinations of 
signals have to match with such patterns in order to be recognized.
57 This process of 
selective perception can be called “abstraction” and regards both physiological (e.g. of 
an object) and conceptual perception (e.g. of an immaterial object, or of a social 
situation). 
The last stage of the cognitive process is represented by the validation of the mental 
models. This does not require, in a constructivist perspective, that an internal (mental) 
representation should be an exact reproduction of the external reality, because this 
would be just a metaphysical ideal, deprived of any operational content. Rather, the 
individual simply needs a rule that establishes that a certain model is provisionally 
“valid”, or “viable”, for action. The constructivist approach introduces the notion of 
“cognitive equilibrium” as a sort of measure to which the viability of a mental 
representation can be related. An individual can be said to be in “cognitive equilibrium” 
if the actions generated by her internal environment are consistent with her objectives, 
given the responses from the external environment.
58   To make the concept of 
provisional viability more operative, the notion of cognitive equilibrium could be 
related to that of satisficing, since it allows that different mind constructions can coexist 
and meet the subjective aspiration levels. Viability is based on what the individual 
experiences, whereas experience here should not be interpreted as observation of events, 
but as action, because it is through action that the individual tests her mental models. 
The result of such testing operates as feedback on the construction of knowledge, which 
leads either to the validation of actual mental models, or to their modification. In this 
way, knowledge is not a direct representation of the world, but a representation of the 
                                                 
55 Tamborini (1997), p. 259. 
56 Cf. Lorenz (1973). 
57 Idem. 
58 Idem.  
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experience of the world.
59 This feedback mechanism lets one characterize the cognitive 
process as self-referential, because every construct, once confronted with the subjective 
experience of the external environment, shall be reflected to the mind which originated 
it, i.e. it shall be self-reflected. Human cognition is recursively engaged in the 
elaboration of mental models out of external stimuli and in their evaluation according to 
the individual experience of the external world, either to consolidate a (subjective) 
viable construct or to modify a non-viable one. 
Knowledge in the constructivist view thus can be characterised through the attributes of 
particularity and possibility, as opposed to the objectivist ideal features of completeness 
and necessity. This allows for heterogeneity and coexistence of mental models.
60 
Particularity stems from the conception of the individual as purpose oriented and guided 
by “interest,” i.e. any purpose (in a broad sense) that can motivate (“cause”) the 
individual’s action. Thus interests “(i) elicit agents´ actions and (ii) direct agents´ 
heuristic procedures in construing an intendedly valid model of the external 
environment. In cognitive terms, interests provide the focus for ´conscious devices´ 
aimed at reducing complexity through pattern creation and signal-pattern matching.”
61 
Interest not only provides a motivation for action, but can also direct the cognitive 
process on which rational action relies. An immediate consequence is that no one needs 
more knowledge than what she needs to manage the situations she is usually confronted 
with; another one is that, since no isomorphic representation of the external 
environment is possible, the selection of an absolutely valid rule can be excluded. So, 
partial knowledge is the intentional result of the cognitive activity of an interested 
individual and not just an exogenous constraint. As such, it explains the persistence of 
heterogeneous mental models and of the consequent behavioural patterns. 
Since knowledge in the constructivist conceptualization is insolubly connected to a 
particular experience, it gives life to a constellation of different mental models. Their 
convergence to collective shared mental models may take place, or may not.
62 If 
individuals interact for a sufficient time, their (heterogeneous) possible mental models 
may eventually converge to a common one (with common knowledge of this). However, 
                                                 
59 Cf. Maturana/Varela (1985). 
60 Cf. Tamborini (1997), pp. 261 - 263. 
61 Cf. Tamborini (1997), p. 261. 
62 Cf. Denzau / North (1994).  
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there is also evidence
63   that, if the exchange of information is imperfect, the 
convergence of beliefs toward a common mental model may be excluded. 
Though admitting the possible heterogeneity of beliefs and mental models, 
constructivism assumes isomorphism among human minds, that is, individuals do not 
differ in the way they know.
64 Also, the notion of an isomorphism can be integrated into 
the bounded rational approach: individuals assume isomorphism, or symmetry, between 
themselves and others and they use the tool of introspection to form beliefs about others. 
 
8.  A Possible Experimental Approach 
 
In this section some speculations on a possible way of experimentally analysing the 
self-referentiality of economic theories and their absorption will be presented. A 
research program on this topic should comprehend a broad spectrum of experiments, 
which aim at the detailed analysis of specific faculties involved in different scenarios of 
economic problem solving. The following considerations will be presented as ideas for 
approaching the wide field of the recursivity of economic theory, and for exploring the 
possibility of testing the validity of economic theories by relying on their absorption by 
bounded rational economic actors. 
The considerations presented in this Section partially rely on the indicative results of 
some pilot classroom experiments, dealing respectively with (1) the experimental 
attempt of debiasing the conjunction-effect bias through meta-information
65, with (2) a 
repeated guessing game with information feedback and meta-instructions and with (3) 
the role of the theory of integrative negotiation in promoting efficiency in multilateral 
negotiations. The experimental evidence, however, will not be explicitly illustrated here, 
however, since neither the size of the sample (which does not offer enough independent 
observations to corroborate any result), nor the experimental conditions (in a classroom 
perfect isolation of the subjects cannot be achieved) allow one to trust such results as 
definitive evidence. 
                                                 
63 Cf. Geanakoplos (1989). 
64 The homogeneity of individual constructions (beliefs, expectations, and so on) is emphasized by the 
“universals approach”, cf. e.g. Hejl (2001a, 2001b). 
65 See e. g. Pombeni (2005).  
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This examination could focus on the testing of mainstream theories, which thus rely on 
the assumption of fully rational economic actors, or on that of bounded rationality. 
Plenty of experimental evidence reveals how theories of unbounded rationality are not 
always descriptive of the observed economic behaviour. Now, the proof of the 
absorption of such theories could work as a test of their “viable” normative validity. On 
the other hand, theories of bounded rationality have tried to interpret and stylize the 
systematic violations of theories of full rationality. So, theory absorption could be seen 
as an ultimate test of validity of the real descriptive power, as well as of the acceptance 
degree, of the bounded rationality approach. 
The effects of the self-referentiality of economic theories and their absorption can be 
experimentally analyzed through the observation of how individuals deal with meta-
theoretical information in different experimental contexts. Meta(-theoretical) 
information  - i.e. theoretic information about the experimental situation the 
experimental subjects face, which aims at adding to the theoretical knowledge of the 
subjects and not simply to their information
66   - could be communicated to the 
experimental subjects in the form of “meta-instructions.” By “meta-instructions” 
instructions are meant that reveal the theory underlying the experimental situation and / 
or previous experimental findings. The information contained in the meta-instructions 
should not overwhelm the cognitive bounded capabilities of the individuals and that 
should be secured by some control questions on the application of the meta-instructions 
or supplemented by a questionnaire at the end of the experimental sessions. 
The experiments could be conducted over two treatments, with and without meta-
instructions, and the comparison between the two treatments would enhance some 
conclusions both on the perception of the self-referentiality of economic theories and on 
theory absorption. In particular, a significant difference between the behaviour of the 
test and of the control groups – respectively with or without meta-instructions – would 
reveal the perception of the self-referentiality of the theory presented in the meta-
instructions, while theory absorption would require compliance with it. The 
experimental hypothesis would be that meta-theoretical information can support the 
bounded rational decision process and improve the outcome’s efficiency degree in 
                                                 
66 The difference between “knowledge” and “information” is here meant as on p. 20.  
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various experimental settings. The experimental research should concern both situations 
of individual decision-making as well as interactive ones. 
Meta-instructions can be also interpreted as an attempt to support the subjective 
rationality, in the sense that if non-optimizing behaviour would simply be a step of a 
discrete optimization process – as sustained by the “as if” approach - individuals would 
choose to optimize, if they could; i.e. they would comply with the theory presented in 
the meta-instructions. It can be argued whether that really happens. In many situations, 
as for instance in beauty contests, coordination or public good games, common 
knowledge of the equilibrium does not eliminate strategic uncertainty. In similar 
settings the outcome of the game cannot be foreseen and the players are mainly 
concerned in predicting the others´ behaviour. In economic interactions where bounded 
rationality of the others matters, meta-information could be expected to promote the 
emerging of a sort of meta-rationality, thou of a behavioural-rationality, which 
transcends full rationality and is superior to it in terms of success in concrete settings. 
However, the absorption of meta-instructions is not a trivial question even for unilateral 
decision making. Supporting the subjective bounded rationality is far from leading to 
perfect rationality, as corroborated by the resistance of several cognitive biases to 
debiasing attempts as well as by the evidence on “less is more” heuristics. The 
absorption of meta-instructions requires their coherency with the subjective beliefs in 
order to be trusted as a valid support to the decision. So, even in situations where it has 
been experimentally shown that actual behaviour differs from the predictions of the 
rational choice theory, theory absorption could test its normative acceptance and 
validity. 
The compliance with meta-instructions based on theory of bounded rationality could 
help in testing the real coherency between the assumptions underlying those theories 
and the mental models of the individuals. The proof of the survival of a theory of 
bounded rationality to its own acceptance could say more about its cognitive reliability.  
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9.  Conclusions 
 
Although reflexive phenomena have been widely observed in economics, the analysis of 
the mechanisms that lead bounded rational individuals to accept and eventually 
comply – in a bounded rational way of course - with the theoretical prescriptions is still 
at its beginning. It should be considered that bounded rational individuals cannot 
process the content of a theory but in a bounded rational way. A better understanding of 
the mechanisms on which theory absorption relies could help defining bounded rational 
expectations and in this way also lead to a better approximation of bounded rational best 
replies and economic forecasts. Practical implications of that could be then extended to 
the training of economic professionals or to policy advising in general.
67 
Because of the self-referential character of social theorizing, its reflexive effects on the 
social actors can potentially never be excluded. To be sure they depend actually on 
different factors: its understanding, acceptance and coherence with the individual 
mental models on the one and with the rationality standard on the other hand. Therefore, 
it should be explained, first, how real economic actors perceive the recursive character 
of economic theorizing; second, if and under which conditions economic theories affect 
in a self-referential way the behaviour of the economic actors; and third, how the self-
referentiality of economic theories can be empirically tested. In a last step one can infer 
conclusions for professional advisers for optimal advising when self-referential effects 
may occur. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (2006b) presents an application of this idea to the 
case of underpinned advices which are confronted with delaying reaction behaviour of 
the addressees. 
It should be stated once again that such a research program cannot just rely on 
theoretical speculations, but needs from the outset to be supported by empirical results. 
In this sense, the present analysis should be interpreted as a programme for approaching 
the wide and complicated field of the recursivity of social theories and economic theory 
in particular, and for exploring the possibility of testing the validity of economic 
theories relying on their absorption by real bounded rational economic actors. 
                                                 
67 “Explaining to bounded rational policy makers on the basis of bounded rational behavioural 
assumptions why and how certain measures may (or may not) work will render policy advice more 
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